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Loose Macroeconomic Policies
The current global financial crisis originated in the US partly because of 
loose monetary policy at the beginning of the decade. In the aftermath 
of the stock market bubble of 1999-2000, the Federal Reserve moved 
aggressively to cut interest rates. During 2002-2004, the Federal Funds 
Rate dropped to 1%-2%, helping to inflate the housing bubble of 
2001-6. When the Federal Funds rate rose to about 5% in 2006-2007, the 
housing bubble burst.
Loose monetary policy in the early 2000s compounded both domestic 
macroeconomic imbalances in the USA and global imbalances. The 
housing bubble led to many working class households shouldering 
large housing liabilities. At the same time, a calamitous drop in personal 
savings took place.
While personal savings as a percentage of disposable income was 
9-10% during the 1970s and 1980s, it fell to around 2% in the early 
2000s. By 2006-7, personal savings had collapsed to 0.4% (see Table 1). 
A savings ratio close to zero is historically unprecedented for a mature 
capitalist economy.
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A major trend, clearly seen in the USA, is the extraction of financial profit by 
commercial banks directly out of personal incomes. 
Growing individual dependence on private finance is apparent in housing, 
including subprime mortgages, but it can also be seen in education, health, 
pensions and insurance. This new practice of ‘financial expropriation’, i.e., the 
systematic extraction of financial profits out of wages and salaries, is one of 
the root causes of the current crisis (see Lapavitsas 2009).
Why were commercial banks motivated to generate financial profits from 
such new sources? The groundwork was laid by financial deregulation, which 
began in the late 1960s. Once deregulation took hold, commercial banks lost 
the captive liabilities (primarily deposits) that had previously sustained their 
activities. 
Equally important is that large corporations have become less reliant on bank 
financing. They have financed their fixed investment either through retained 
earnings or direct borrowing in open markets. Hence, commercial banks have 
had to search for new profit-making opportunities. A decisive response was 
to turn to consumer and real-estate loans. In the US, the share of such loans 
in total bank lending rose from around 30% in the 1960s to almost 50% in the 
mid-2000s (see Figure 1). 
Lending to individuals can often be predatory, an aspect that took extreme 
forms in the course of the recent bubble. Mortgage lending rose dramatically 
in the US during 2001-2003, and then dipped, but remained at a very high 
level. As demand for ordinary mortgages began to slow after 2003, lenders 
increasingly offered subprime mortgages. 
During 2004-2006, such mortgages totalled US$ 1.75 trillion, or almost one 
fifth of all new mortgages. They were marketed to the poorer segments of the 
US working class, many of the borrowers being Black or Latino households.
In 2007, the difference between aggregate domestic savings and 
investment in the US approached 5% of GDP. This gap corresponded to 
a ballooning US trade deficit, which exceeded US$ 700 billion during 
2005-2007. The USA economy was on the edge of major financial 
instability even before its housing market imploded.
Meanwhile, the USA government ran large fiscal deficits in the 
early 2000s. These were heavily dependent on the purchase of US 
government securities by countries with substantial current account 
surpluses. In order to protect themselves against sudden capital 
outflows—which were common during the financial crises of the 
late 1990s—many developing countries had begun to build large 
precautionary stocks of international reserves. 
This trend was most pronounced in developing Asia, whose aggregate 
current-account surplus had risen to almost 7% of GDP in 2007. 
China alone held international reserves worth more than US$ one 
trillion at the end of 2007. The great bulk of such reserves were held 
in US government securities. Despite low rates of return, developing 
countries continued to funnel their excess savings into the US economy, 
where they were important to sustaining the US bubble even after the 
Fed began to raise interest rates.
Transformation of Finance
In addition to macroeconomic imbalances, the global crisis arose 
because of profound transformations in the financial system.
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Table 1: Personal Savings as a Percentage of Disposable 
Income, USA, 2000-2007
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association; Mortgage Origination Estimates, updated 
March 24, 2008
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Figure 1: Lending to Consumers and Real Estate as a Percentage of 
Total Bank Lending, USA
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts, USA, Federal Reserve
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Poor households were often lured into shouldering such mortgages 
because they were offered low initial interest rates, which could be 
adjusted upwards later by the lenders (the so-called Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages or ARMs). During 2004-2006, ARMs totalled US$ 4.3 trillion, 
or almost half of all new mortgages. There was little chance, at the 
outset, that a large proportion of these would be repaid.
The Spread of Securitisation
Another major trend in the transformation of finance was the adoption 
by commercial banks of the practices of investment banking. Banks 
began to seek profits by operating in open financial markets, or through 
proprietary trading. Financial engineering and the rise of derivatives 
trading have been associated with the turn of commercial banks toward 
such financial practices. 
The combination of the two major trends that we have highlighted, 
namely, drawing profits from personal incomes and resorting to 
investment banking, led to the huge financial bubble of 2001-2007.
The housing collapse in the USA would not have precipitated a 
global crisis had commercial banks not adopted investment banking 
techniques. This took the form of widespread securitisation of mortgage 
loans. Simply defined, securitisation meant parcelling subprime 
mortgages into small amounts, packaging them with large composites 
of assets and selling the lots as new securities. 
During 2004-2006, almost 80% of all subprime mortgages were 
securitised. As a result, subprime-mortgage-backed securities ended 
up in the portfolios of major financial institutions throughout the 
world. When US subprime mortgage holders began to default in large 
numbers in 2007, the rapid increase in the risks of such securities had 
an immediate global impact. Many financial institutions suddenly faced 
illiquidity since mortgage-backed securities were no longer saleable.
Why were commercial banks able to adopt functions traditionally 
reserved for investment banks? One factor was the successive waves 
of mergers and acquisitions after the early 1980s that created greater 
scope for securities underwriting and placement. Another was the 
introduction of measures, such as the 401K private pension schemes, 
which channelled the savings of working class households into open 
financial markets. 
A further factor was financial engineering, which also created 
opportunities for banks to trade on their own account.  These factors 
were exacerbated by the abolition in 1999 of the Glass-Steagall Act (in 
force since 1933), which now formally enabled commercial banks to 
engage in riskier investment banking practices. 
The adoption of investment banking functions meant that commercial 
banks became heavily reliant on borrowing liquidity in open financial 
markets.  
By ‘securitising’ mortgages and selling them off to other financial 
institutions, they seemed able to generate further liquidity to deal with 
liability demands while maintaining a brisk pace of new lending. 
Commercial banks were thus encouraged to minimise traditional 
liquidity cushions on their balance sheets. Furthermore, by securitising 
mortgages, they appeared to shift credit risk off their balance sheets, 
and could minimise the amount of capital held to support their assets. 
For a short period of time, securitisation seemed a marvellous device 
that allowed commercial banks simultaneously to generate more 
liquidity, remain solvent, and make large profits. However, when the 
housing bubble in the USA eventually burst and mortgage-backed 
assets became unsaleable, this strategy quickly unravelled. 
Financial Crisis Ensues
Saddled with mortgage-backed assets, both investment and 
commercial banks were unable to borrow freely in the money market. 
The disappearance of liquidity began to push several banks toward 
insolvency since they could not refinance their obligations. Collapsing 
asset prices then led to large losses. With bank solvency in doubt, 
liquidity became even scarcer.
The destructive interplay of illiquidity and insolvency eventually led 
to the bankruptcy of independent investment banks, which had 
been operating with extremely low capital ratios. Commercial banks, 
meanwhile, were placed in a similar predicament, further compounded 
by the risk of runs on their deposits. Inevitably banks became extremely 
conservative about further lending, and the collapse of securitisation 
led to credit shortages.  
Tightness of credit impacted on aggregate demand, leading to falling 
output, collapsing exports and rising unemployment. A full-blown 
financial crisis became a severe and widespread recession affecting both 
developed and developing countries.
At present large numbers of commercial banks in developed countries 
are effectively bankrupt, surviving purely because of state support of 
their capital and liquidity. Therefore, confronting the recession should 
also involve dealing with the systemic financial problems at the root 
of the crisis. Policies should tackle the failure of deregulated banking 
that combines commercial and investment functions. Policies should 
also deal with the macroeconomic imbalances that encouraged the 
speculative financial excesses of the last decade. 
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